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The end of the Cold war catalysed considerable recalibration in the world's security ar­
chitecture. In Australia, whilst this entailed a closer embrace of Asia, the South Pacific 
did not initially engage Australian security interests. However, post 11 September 2001 
and post the terrorist attacks in Bali of October 2002, much has changed. The notion 
of'comprehensive security'—in which Pacific security is seen as a function of a wide 
variety of social, political and strategic phenomena—has assumed such prominence 
it has ushered in an expanded justification for one state to intervene in the affairs of 
another. Although, as in the case of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon 
Islands, such intervention has required invitation and multinational coalitions under 
the rubric'cooperative intervention', the extent and nature of Australian-led initiatives 
in the South Pacific has raised concerns. Key amongst these concerns is the extent to 
which policies such as tied-aid and 'extended cooperation'might erode South Pacific 
sovereignty and the consensus politics of the Pacific Way. This article considers these 
issues against the backdrop of very significant changes to the region's key political 
body, the Pacific Forum. It suggests that although Australia is commendably active in 
strengthening the Pacific's security net, greater sensitivity to Pacific concerns might 
better effect her longer-term security objectives.
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126 Introduction
During theCold war, discourseon Asia-Pacific regional security was premised upon 
exclusionary assumptions:'the region'was where the US exercised influence and 
the Soviet Union did not. Likewise/security policy'eschewed positive conditions 
such as peace, participation or emancipation in the name of mere stability.1 
Unsurprisingly, the end of the Cold War wrought considerable change worldwide 
- including an attendant proliferation of 'failed' and 'rogue' states. Transnational 
crime, quick to flourish in the slipstream of globalisation, ushered in an expanded 
concept of 'security'. Supplanting the hubs and spokes of bilateral alliances 
that had maintained the cordon sanitaire around the Soviet Union grew a raft 
of multilateral institutions,2 mandated to facilitate the attainment of a regional 
security that could be branded "common, comprehensive and cooperative".3 So 
too in the Asia-Pacific region, the early nineties brought a significant change in 
security architecture and discourse. In effecting this new discourse, the attentions 
of Australian strategic planners initially leap-frogged immediate neighbours in the 
South Pacific and focused instead upon protecting Australia's strategic interests 
through engagement with South-East Asia. The medicine for more proximate 
regional problems was a liberal dose of aid coupled with the "clever management 
of trouble".4
The terrorist attacks in Bali in October 2002, however, wrought a paradigm shift in 
Australian strategic planning.The security radar of Australia swept more cautiously 
across the South Pacific. Blips such as the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea 
and Fiji came to assume greater significance. Response mechanisms, however, 
were less clear. As exemplified by Australia's political disengagement from post­
coup Fiji, "clever management" had been non-interventionist and had respected 
the sovereign interests of Australia's Pacific neighbours. Canberra's decision in 
mid-2003 to promote direct intervention in the Solomon Islands, albeit under the 
umbrella of'regional assistance', ushered in a fresh strategic approach to problems 
of state stability: the doctrine of'cooperative intervention'.
This paper considers the emergence of'comprehensive security'and'cooperative 
intervention'as pillars of Australian security policy. More particularly, it examines 
Canberra's connection between the two—as manifested especially by Australia's 
leading role in the recent intervention the Solomon Islands. It considers also the 
consequent, and impressive, breadth of Australia's (more conventional) assistance 
in the law and justice sectors of her Pacific Island neighbours. Finally, and against 
this backdrop, the future for regional cooperation is assessed. It is argued that, 
particularly in the area of regional crisis management, the romance of consensus 
politics, as enshrined by the evocative notion of the 'Pacific Way', is most unlikely
to withstand a stealthy and concerted application of an Australian regional J 2 7  
security strategy that already betrays unilateralist undertones and is impelled by 
the politically crucial imperative of avoiding another Bali. Ultimately, however, a 
Canberra-driven assault upon the'Pacific Way'may prove self-defeating.
The emergence of comprehensive security
In the early to mid-nineties, 'security' came to entail two central propositions: 
(i) that security depends principally not upon countering military threat but 
upon creating 'human security'—a notion that encompasses respect for human 
rights, the protection of the environment, provision of employment and brighter 
prospects for future generations;5and (ii) that effecting such security requires a 
multilateral, cooperative approach— one that sits outside alliance structures 
and espouses the'soft'politics of confidence building measures-and preventive 
diplomacy.6
Even adorned with modifiers such as "cooperative" and "comprehensive", security 
in the Asia-Pacific has remained steadfastly dominated by the realism of state self- 
interest.7 This is perhaps unremarkable as, despite its failures, the nation state is 
the "most pervasive and effective form of exclusion in world politics"8 and is seen 
as the only vehicle capable of providing any form of regional security. As the 
Australian Prime Minister has only recently noted, this especially true today:
Despite all we know about the importance of non-state actors in the 
international system, the nation state remains the focus of legitimate 
action for order and justice in our world. September 11 returned the state 
to centre-stage for the oldest of reasons—the provision of security.9
Until recently, the islands of the South Pacific had been largely divorced from this 
new security discourse. Australia, clearly the major regional power, chose to focus 
primarily upon South-East Asia in terms of both security and trade.10 The South 
Pacific Forum's 1992 Honiara Declaration on Law Enforcement Cooperation did, 
however, note a need for a "more comprehensive, integrated and collaborative 
approach" to "threats from criminal activities" and mandated the Forum Regional 
Security Committee to, inter alia, "establish a framework for increasing contacts 
amongst specialist agencies".11 In 1997, this bedrock declaration was followed by 
another:theAitutaki Declaration on RegionalSecurityCooperation.Reflectiveofthe 
new discourse, the Aitutaki Declaration commenced with the express observation 
that "an adverse law enforcement environment could threaten the sovereignty, 
security and economic integrity of Forum members and jeopardise economic and 
social development". A need was identified for a "more comprehensive approach CE
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128 to regional security consistent with the relevant principles of the United Nation's 
'Agenda for Peace'". Principles of 'good governance', 'international cooperation' 
and 'preventive diplomacy'were espoused.
Similar sentiments carried through to the Biketawa declaration of 2002 which 
recognised the "vulnerability of member countries to threats to their security, 
broadly defined, and the importance of cooperation among members in dealing 
with such threats when they arise" (emphasis added). The Nasonirii Declaration 
on Regional Security followed in 2003 and served to underscore the "heightened 
threat to global security"following the attacks of 11 September 2001, "in particular 
those posed by international terrorism and transnational crime". It exhorted 
member states to enact appropriate legislation, including anti-money laundering 
legislation, and to "develop strategies to combat serious crime".
Post-September 11 and post-Bali, Australia is very much a part of this emergent 
security discourse. This is perhaps unsurprising. On 12 November 2002— exactly 
one calendar month after the devastating attacks in Kuta, Bali—Al Q'aeda leader 
Osama Bin Laden announced (via videotape released in the United Kingdom):
We warned Australia before not to join in in Afghanistan, and against its 
despicable effort to separate East Timor. It ignored our warning until it 
woke up to the sounds of explosions in Bali. Its government falsely claimed 
that they were not targeted.12
Unsurprisingly, Australian Minister of Defence, Robert Hill, now speaks of the 
"dangers of trying to draw a line around Australia's strategic interests":
...regional terrorism, global security and the defence of Australia in this 
new strategic environment are very much the same thing.13
Identified in the 1997 Aitutaki Declaration and seen ever since as an increasingly 
integral precondition to comprehensive security is the notion of'good governance'. 
Indeed, underthe Biketawa Declaration/good governance'was pitched alongside 
democracy as a"GuidingPrinciple"to which member states considered themselves 
committed. Good governance itself was defined as "the exercise of authority 
(leadership) and interactions in a manner that is open, transparent, accountable, 
participatory, consultative and decisive but fair and equitable". Although this 
definition is silent on appropriate economic policy, where the only two regional 
powers—Australia and New Zealand— both ardently pursue free-market agendas, 
notions of'good governance'areaptto connote the implementation of neoliberal 
reform. Indeed, Australia has already announced her intentions to place a "strong 
focus" on the "economic and financial management" of her Pacific neighbours.14
This is not of purely fiscal interest: in considering threats to the security of the 
region, "broadly defined", the Aitutaki Declaration lumps "economic policy" in 
with nefarious phenomena such as drug trafficking and natural disasters as "the 
most immediate risks to security in the region".15
The emergence of cooperative intervention
The Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) 
commenced on 24 July 2003 and attested a"paradigm shift in Canberra's strategic 
thinking".16 The decision to intervene closely followed the June 2003 release of an 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) report entitled "Our failing neighbour: 
Australia and the future of Solomon Islands". The report urged a "sustained 
and comprehensive multinational effort" led by Australia and consented to by 
Honiara. The report acknowledged that such intervention would "take us across 
a major threshold, and challenge the foundations of our policy in the Southwest 
Pacific, which involves providing countries with aid, but expecting them to solve 
their own problems".17 In a supportive launching of the report, Australia's Foreign 
Minister, Alexander Downer, announced that Australia will not"sit back and watch 
while a country struggles".18 He added:
Direct engagement, including security assistance, might be needed. Such 
engagement would involve cooperative intervention—working with and 
at the request of the relevant government, together with other partners 
in the region.19
Yet Australia had for years refused requests for assistance by the Solomons. 
Indeed in January, only five months earlier, Mr Downer had declared:
Sending in Australian troops to occupy the Solomon Islands would be folly 
in the extreme. It would be widely resented in the Pacific region. It would 
not work, no matter how it wds dressed up.20
Although the Foreign Minister sought to explain this volte-face on the basis that 
earlier intervention would have pre-empted the peace process and entailed 
"imposing an external solution by force",21 Canberra's earlier position was in fact 
entirely "consistent with its previous 'indigenous solutions' policy approach" 
and was "based on the calculation that Australia's interests were not sufficiently 
engaged to warrant direct police or military intervention".22 This was reflective of 
a broader antipathy in which South Pacific regional politics was seen merely as a 
matter of "cleverly managing trouble".23
The success of the Australian-led INTERFET operation in East Timor "doubtless C
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130 played a part in fostering Canberra's attitude change".24 By July 2003, Canberra 
understood that Australian-controlled "multilateral" operations could provide 
effective delivery vehicles in an emerging, interventionist climate.25
Conventional security cooperation
Despite suggestions in the 2003 Australian Foreign Affairs and Trade White Paper 
that "Australia cannot presume to fix the problems of the South Pacific countries", 
that "Australia is not a neo-colonial power" and that "the island countries are 
independent sovereign states", Australia is intensely involved in strengthening 
the region's comprehensive security net.
In PNG, Australia is undertaking an 'Enhanced Cooperation Program'(ECP). The 
ECP comes on the back of long-standing attempts at extensive sector reform 
programmes in PNG (costing some A$60 million) and in Fiji. As originally 
announced in December 2003, the programme required PNG to accept 230 
Australian Federal Police (AFP) and around 80 bureaucratic'advisers'as officers 
of the PNG state, including even an Australian replacement for the PNG Solicitor 
General. Not surprisingly, the leaders of PNG saw this intensified relationship as 
problematic and negotiations over the ECP dragged through to June 2004. Today, 
the program has been formalised by way of an addition to the overall Australia- 
PNG treaty. The AFP deployment— by far the most significant aspect of the ECP— 
currently stands at 125:106 in Port Moresby and a further 19 in Bougainville.26
In Indonesia, Australia is implementing both a A$10 million counter-terrorism 
initiativeand a A$3.5 million anti money laundering programme.27 It is undertaking 
ongoing work to help improve the capacity of the Samoan and Vanuatu police 
forces.28 In August 2003, Prime Minister Howard presented the Pacific Islands 
Forum with a Pacific Regional Police Initiative auguring the establishment, in Suva, 
of a training centre capable of developing a 'regional police force' at the rate of 
900 officers per year.29 Australia has also helped to establish 'Transnational Crime 
Units'in the police forces of Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea.30 
A Solomon Islands unit is slated for launch mid this year.31 These units have not 
only key intelligence-gathering functions but are primary operational institutions 
in policing transnational crime.32 In April 2004 the Australian Federal Police 
'Law Enforcement Cooperation Programme' established a Pacific Transnational 
Crime Coordination Centre in Suva. This will constitute a regional hub linking 
the national Transnational Crime Units—again for both intelligence sharing and 
operational purposes. More recently still, in July 2004 the Jakarta Centre for 
Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) was officially opened pursuant to a joint 
initiative between the Australian and Indonesian governments. The Centre's 
objective is to enhance the operational expertise of regional law enforcement
agencies in dealing with transnational crime. Australia and Indonesia also co­
chaired a Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism in Bali in February 
2004—a meeting that "produced concrete outcomes in the critical areas of law 
enforcement, information sharing and legal frameworks".33
Consistent with Canberra's move towards 'tied aid; the cooperation model 
effected by Australia thodghout the region is no longer one of long-term financial 
assistance but one in which'key personnel'are inserted into the law and justice 
structures of Pacific states.34 An examination of the nature of some of these key 
positions similarly bears out the emphasis now placed upon good governance. 
The'Special Coordinator'to RAMSI is an Australian. Australia funds the positions 
of Police Commissioner and Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions in Fiji. On 29 
October 2004, Australia deployed to Nauru two senior police officers to fill the 
roles of'Director of Police'and 'Special Police Adviser'.35 An Australian is likely to 
replace the outgoing British police commissioner of the SolomonHslands.36
"Big Brother"? tied aid and interventionism
At the launch of the ASPI report, Australia’s Foreign Minister carefully imbued his 
"struggling neighbour"speech with liberalistic vernacular:
I was in Solomon Islands late last year and the human cost of this trouble is 
obvious.There are high numbers of unemployed young people wandering 
the streets. Children are not receiving the education they need because 
teachers are not being paid on time and schools lack sufficient funding. 
Without donor help, there would be no health services in the provinces. 
Last month there was another tragic incident involving the murder of 
an Australian missionary. Economic activity will not revive without an 
improvement in law and order.37
Yet in a separate report published only a few months later, the author of the 
"failing neighbour" report, Elsina Wainright, graphically laid plain Australia's own 
security interests:
Failed or failing states are often petri dishes for transnational criminal 
activity such as money laundering, arms smuggling, drug trafficking, 
people trafficking, and terrorism.38
The report also identified a wider strategic dimension to Australia's security 
interests: a bankrupt Solomons would have provided potential for a foreign 
power to establish influence in the region.39 Prime Minister John Floward was CE
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132 also less altruistic in his justifications, stating that a "failed state" could become 
a "haven for terrorists, drug-runners and money-launderers".40 Presaging the 
AFP's expanded role in implementing interventionist Australian policy is the 
creation of the 500-strong AFP'International Deployment Group'to "strengthen 
Australia's involvement in peace-keeping operations, missions to restore law 
and order, and the delivery of capacity-building initiatives in the region".41 More 
dramatically, at the time of the Bali attacks, the Prime Minister gave a warning 
that, in future, Australia might take pre-emptive action against terrorist bases in 
other countries42
Canberra has also sought to tie its provision of aid to the region. At the Forum 
Leaders' Special Retreat in Auckland in April 2004, Mr Floward announced that 
"increasingly in the future Australia will be saying as a condition of aid that 
corruption must be eliminated".43 This is a very significant flexing of power: per 
capita, the South Pacific receives more aid than any other region in the world44— 
the lion's share coming from Australia.45 Unsurprisingly, Mr Howard's comments 
met with indignation from other leaders— Fiji's Prime Minister, Laisenia Qarase, 
retorting (somewhat emptily) that "Fiji also has the right to choose whether 
we accept the aid as an independent and sovereign state".46 Express demands 
upon PNG to either deal with corruption or lose aid prompted Prime Minister 
Sir Michael Somare to suggest that Australia could not form a government of 
1000 tribes whereas "we have made a success of it".47 Australian aid constitutes 
one fifth of PNG's budget. PNG ranks 118th out of 133 countries in Transparency 
International's'corruption perceptions index'.48 As evidenced by the ECP, continued 
protestations from Port Moresby unsurprisingly rang hollow in Canberra.49
A thirty-year track record of failed aid policies for the Solomon Islands provided a 
further catalyst for RAMSI—the ASPI "failing neighbour" report asserting that the 
provision of further aid would have, at best, a "palliative" effect.50 This emerging, 
avuncular policy shift was soon applicable to the entire South Pacific. Following the 
launch of RAMSI, Prime Minister Howard stated that RAMSI could lead to "pooled 
regional governance" among island states that are "too small to be viable".51 In 
October 2003, Alexander Downer announced that "in the rest of the region our 
engagement will be based on an increasingly robust dialogue on reform"and that 
"governance is now at the centre of all our programs in the region, with a strong 
focus on law and order and economic and financial management."52
"Robust dialogue" is also employed to propel neoliberal economics through the 
Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER). Concerns are frequently 
voiced as to the effects of PACER upon small island nations too under-resourced 
to properly analyse the long-term ramifications of reciprocated free-trade. Some
accounts of the initial negotiations in the formulation of that agreement also J 3 3
"reveal a pattern of arrogance and intimidation that was led by Australia and 
condoned, and sometimes mirrored, by New Zealand".53
In August 2003, an Australian parliamentary inquiry into relations with the 
Pacific reported regional disapproval at Australia's "big brother" approach.54 This 
disapproval has also been noted by many writers and eminent commentators.
Back in August 2000, prominent Pacific affairs analyst Professor Ron Crocombe 
commented that "naive and patronising lectures, postures and threats from 
political leaders are losing Australia and New Zealand support throughout the 
region".55 Doubtless, Alexander Downer's refusal to apologise over the recent 
diplomatic debacle that saw the next Forum Chair, Sir Michael Somare, being 
required to remove his shoes in a security check at Brisbane airport will do little to 
assuage these perceptions of arrogance.56
The future for cooperation
The future of political consensus and true cooperation will turn upon the 
effectiveness of the Pacific Islands Forum as a voice and vehicle for genuinely 
multilateral action. The Forum's Auckland Declaration, reached at the Leaders'
Special Retreat in April 2004, asserts that the "key goals" of the Forum are 
"economic growth, sustainable development, good governance and security''and 
that "these goals should form the principal focus of the Forum and its Secretariat".
These goals are products of a greater "vision" of a "Pacific region that is respected 
for the quality of its governance, the sustainable management of its resources, 
the full observance of democratic values, and for its defence and promotion of 
human rights". The vision itself is the first step in implementing recommendations 
made by an 'Eminent Persons Group' (EPG) in a wholesale review of the Forum 
and its secretariat. The EPG review notes that the Pacific is facing "considerable 
challenges" and that overcoming them will require action "not only by national 
Governments but also at the regional level". It calls for a'Pacific Plan'for"intensified 
regional cooperation"that envisages "the pooling of regional resources in a range 
of areas of governance", including the area of"regional law enforcement aimed at 
trans-national crime":
It might be possible to consider introducing a regional panel of judges, a 
common list of Pacific prosecutors, a regional shipping registry, a regional 
financial intelligence unit...57
Success, the report posits, "involves a redefinition of the traditional 'Pacific Way' 
of doing things".
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134 In urging "intensified cooperation'; the report expressly recognises that "trans 
-national and regional security issues are seen by many in the region as likely 
to dominate Forum attention for at least the next few years".58 From a security 
cooperation perspective, a review of the Forum along the lines contained 
in the EPG report is sensible lest the Forum's declarations end up as "empty 
frameworks of cooperation''.59 The 1997 Aitutaki Declaration, although noting 
that "existing arrangements" had failed to provide mechanisms that would 
"enable members to respond promptly and effectively to requests for assistance", 
failed to augur a greater role for the Forum or its secretariat in policy creation and 
implementation, presaging instead some future agreement by Forum leaders 
to develop procedures to "better facilitate responses by the region's disciplined 
forces". The Biketawa Declaration, in dealing with the highly salient issue of 
regional emergency management, paradoxically gives "a ritual bow"60 to state 
sovereignty by expressly noting the essentiality of "respecting the principles of 
non-interference", in short, "the so-called 'Pacific Way'[has been] a variant of the 
ASEAN Way in Pacific garb".61
Implementation of the Pacific Plan will clearly vest greater prominence and 
power in the Forum Secretariat. Indeed, the EPG recommends "a new Agreement 
that updates and clearly sets down the role, functions and responsibilities of the 
Secretariat" as well as the appointment of a second Deputy Secretary General. 
It also underscores the "principal functions" of the Secretariat: policy advice, 
coordination and implementation of leaders' decisions, "rather than the project 
implementation and technical assistance functions that it has acquired over the 
years". Paradoxically, a huge amount of this"project implementation and technical 
assistance" is in the law and justice sector, particularly through legislative reform 
and capacity building in the area of transnational crime prevention and counter­
terrorism. The integral role of the Secretariat in these areas and the absence of an 
obvious alternative make it difficult to believe that the Secretariat will relinquish 
these functions in the near future.
Although the EPG has recommended that the Forum "mainstream" the concerns 
of "vulnerable Small Island States" into its work, there is concern that the Pacific 
Plan could prove a "Trojan horse that propels [Australia's neoliberal] agenda into 
the heart of the Pacific".62 To the extent that the agendas can now be separated, 
the same horse would, of course, propel Australia's 'cooperative intervention' 
security agenda. Indeed, there are signs that these early processes of reform 
have already been exploited. At the Forum Leaders' Summit in 2001, Australia 
initiated the removal of the requirement that the Secretary General come from a 
Small Island Nation. At the following year's Summit, it succeeded in ousting the 
unwritten convention of appointment by consensus, replacing it with a written
election process. To complete the trifecta, in 2003 it secured the election of an 
Australian, Greg Urwin, as Secretary General. Moreover, the election itself was 
attended by "two days of haggling"63 and allegations of Australian interference.64 
These developments are all the more significant as the Pacific Plan envisages a 
radically expanded role for the Secretary General in "setting Forum agendas and 
coordinating responses by members to regional events, particularly crises".65 
Although such action must be taken in close consultation with Leaders, the 
Secretary General is nevertheless projected to exercise executive function and 
"to take a proactive role".66 Pacific-wide ownership of the Forum is now seen as 
being at risk:
This sense of ownership has been eroded in recent years as economic, 
political and security initiatives of the Forum seem to be increasingly driven 
by Australia and New Zealand (who also control the purse strings). The 
appointment of an Australian to the Secretary General position will make 
it harder to reverse this trend, especially if he is expected by his sponsors 
to be more proactive and lead a major overhaul of the organization.67
The EPG review itself is not above allegations of partisanship: it evolved from a 
review of the capacity of the Forum to'Tneet a rapidly expanding array of demands" 
into "a review of the Forum itself".68 The EPG's Reflection Group members were 
predominantly New Zealanders. New Zealand trade officials helped write the final 
report. This implicates Australia as there is a strong perception that "Wellington 
plays London to Canberra's Washington".69 Indeed, the report's references to "the 
pooling of regional resources in a range of areas of governance" so as to "offer 
improved efficiencies"is uncannily reflective of comments by the Australian Prime 
Minister's to the effect that RAMSI could lead to "pooled regional governance" 
among island states that are "too small to be viable".70
A revamped Forum headed by an Australian with a proactive mandate to 
coordinate responses "to regional events, particularly crises" fits neatly with 
Australia's existing plans. In February 2004, ASPI released a report on the Australian 
Government's increasing use of Australian Federal Police to preserve regional 
security, noting that more than 7% of AFP personnel are deployed overseas.71 
Initiatives such as these, the creation of the AFP'International Deployment Group' 
and the Pacific Regional Police Initiative reflect the views expressed in the 2003 
Australian Senate Committee Report that "preventing state decline is cheaper 
than allowing states to deteriorate".72
Although RAMSI has produced a political environment capable of sustaining C
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136 effective government, Australia's "proactive role in advancing intervention"73 and 
in "cobbling together"74 the consensus required by its doctrine of cooperative 
intervention has raised concerns. Indeed, allegations have been made that 
although "dressed up as a Pacific Islands Forum project at the invitation of the 
Solomons Government'; the reality was that "the landing date was set and forces 
put into motion three weeks before the paperwork was done".75 Under the 
proposed Pacific Plan it will be the Australian Secretary General, Mr Urwin, who 
will have the moral and executive mandate to steer future interventions. So long 
as the hands on the reins remain Australian, however, to many the horse itself 
will appear suspiciously Trojan. Moreover, Australia's firm grip on the region's law 
and justice sectors, the immense importance of Australian aid to the region and 
Canberra's demonstrated preparedness to tie its provision to'good governance' 
will certainly provide leverage when both'requests'and'consensus'are considered 
necessary.76
Several academics are critical of not only the processes but the interventionist, 
"panic-driven" responses themselves. At an inter-sessionary'panel discussion'on 
"Challenges to Governance in the Pacific" at this year's FRSC meeting in Fiji, Dr 
Sinclair Dinnan of the Australian National University challenged the appellation 
"failed state", remarking that it falsely presumes a previously "functioning state" 
(as opposed to one long beleaguered by inappropriate institutions inherited 
from former colonial rule) and posits a false notion that imposing (urbanised) 
government from "the top down" is the only appropriate model.77
The Pacific Way? more carrot— less stick.
In announcing Australia's emergent 'cooperative intervention' policy in his 
"struggling neighbour" speech, Alexander Downer saw multilateralism as 
essential. However, the successes of INTERFET and RAMSI have led to more US 
vernacular and increased talk of'coalitions of the willing'.78 Such triumphs have 
their dangers:
Such strikes [RAMSI] can have a certain seductive attraction. Unless the 
terms of such interventions are clearly spelled out and are fully understood 
by the wider international community, they can do unintended damage 
to the established substructure of regional diplomacy and important 
bilateral relations. Once delegitimised, the delicate multilateral balance, 
painstakingly constructed in the aftermath of World War Two, would be 
difficult to repair.79
Indeed, in a radical bid for pre-invasion support to the United States in the War
in Iraq, Australian Prime Minister John Howard suggested changing the United 
Nations Charter to allow "pre-emptive self-defence".80 Unsurprisingly, many are 
now concerned at the potential breadth of the Howard / Downer doctrine of 
cooperative intervention:
The same principle, if unchecked, could end up being an Australian version 
of a la carte multilateralism, where multilateral collaboration serves as little 
more than a highly selective enterprise for advancing Canberra's interests, 
quite possibly at the expense of those of the region as a whole. If so, the 
Forum process could well be undermined should Australia succumb to the 
temptation for which America, in its post-9/11 intolerance, seems to have 
fallen. In this regard, Australia's announced intention to regard multilateral 
action as less effective than coalitions of the willing raisin troubling 
questions.81
John Howard's recent Lowy Lecture on "Australia in the World"will have done little 
to assuage concerns of "a la carte" policy formulation:
Challenges near and far demand a sense of balance and flexibility in our 
policy approach. Just as the national interest is not static, nor should our 
global engagement be hostage to yesterday's conventional wisdom. 
Just as our country prospered from the fresh eyes Frank Lowy brought 
to a world of opportunities, so each generation of Australians must look 
anew at the eternal pursuit of our country's security and prosperity. We 
have learned that, if we make the right choices, Australians can shape our 
environment and our destiny, not simply be takers of trends set elsewhere.
We have learned that global engagement is demanding work requiring 
large resources, great stamina and reserves of patience. And it can only 
be sustained through constant dialogue with the interests and instincts of 
the Australian people.82
Australia's own 'comprehensive security' needs and the regional leverage she 
gains in its pursuit augur magnificently for future Canberra-driven regional 
cooperation initiatives. As the government itself states: "Our objective is to 
achieve practical results that improve the overall security of the region and 
protect Australian interests in the process".83 Less certain is whether the Pacific 
Island 'recipients' of this 'cooperation'will be able to heed the exhortations of 
that visionary Fijian leader, the late Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, by retaining "firm 
control of their destinies". This of itself is unremarkable: Australian tax-payers can 
reasonably expect their government to be dutiful in its administration of foreign CE
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138 aid - particularly as liberal approaches have consistently failed. For those states 
largely sustained by Australian aid, such as PNG, a stiff dose of realist policy is 
not only to be expected but, arguably, required. Similarly, as attested by the 
self-congratulatory atmosphere during the 'RAMSI update' to the 2004 Forum 
Regional Security Committee meeting, RAMSI is apt to be hoisted aloft as a truly 
regional success, notwithstanding the backroom "haggling" that attended its 
inception.
Prognoses for future cooperation, however, turn as much upon politics as policy. 
Institutions that enable region-wide resource-sharing, as so openly espoused by 
John Howard, requireapoliticalclimatethatconducescooperation. Unfortunately, 
where political climate matters most— in the Forum itself—Australia is wide open 
to allegations of gross manipulation.
Such allegations matter. The Forum's Pacific Plan will challenge Pacific Island 
leaders to be brave in reformulating notions of sovereignty. As Samoan Prime 
Minister and current Forum Chair, Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi, observed at the 
Forum Leaders' review of the Plan only this March, "in a globalised world none 
of us can remain an island... Over the next few years we will need to explore 
how far we can take our sense of shared sovereignty, and shared responsibility, 
in our pursuit of regionalism".84 These are early days for the Pacific Plan. Success 
at this delicate stage will require not only Pacific confidence in the Forum, its 
secretariat and its processes but also a climate of persuasion— not provocation. 
An Australian foreign policy that purports to flex "through constant dialogue 
with the interests and instincts of the Australian people" certainly cannot be sold 
through process manipulation and "naive and patronising lectures" that only 
antagonise the already exposed nerve-ends of Pacific sovereignty. For all that 
change may be required, the Howard government would do well to note that the 
'Pacific Way' is less about what is done than how it is done.
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